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as Legal Mechanisms of 
Access Control: Lessons 
from the US Experience
MARY W. S. WONG*
Abstract
The common law doctrine of trespass to chattels has recently been revived
and applied by courts in the United States (US) to cover intrusions (in the
form of electronic signals) to computer systems connected to the Internet.
These cases represent judicial recognition of the need to protect certain
unwanted intrusions in cyberspace, though the principles developed
therewith are remarkably expansive. As such, they overlap with the con-
cept of ‘unauthorized access’ under computer misuse legislation in the
US and elsewhere. This overlap has yet to be judicially acknowledged.
Since the US, the United Kingdom and other common law countries not
only share a common law ancestry but also ‘unauthorized access’ princi-
ples as the primary trigger for computer misuse, this paper seeks to exam-
ine the consequences of developing a broad cyber-trespass doctrine beyond
the US, and its corresponding implications for judicial interpretations of
‘unauthorized access’ in the common law world.
* LLB (NUS), LLM (Cantab.), Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center, USA. E-mail: fatamagistra@
gmail.com This paper was funded by the Office of Research at the Singapore Management University (SMU),
where the author was an Associate Professor of Law. I would like to thank Professor Bobby Mariano and the
staff at the SMU Office of Research, my former colleagues at SMU and my current colleagues at Pierce Law for
their encouragement and support of this research. All errors and omissions remain, of course, my own.
Published in International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 2007 March, 
15(1), pp. 90-128 
https://do .org/10.1093/ijlit/eal014
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
MARY W. S. WONG
91
1 Introduction
In the realm of torts and what may conveniently be termed ‘cyberlaw’1, an
interesting point of comparison (or perhaps more accurately, difference)
between the United States (US) and English2 common law can be found
in the development of the cause of action in cyber-trespass in the former
jurisdiction. Where the US courts have been faced with several cases con-
cerning acts of unwanted interference with computer systems and net-
works that have been alleged to constitute trespasses to such systems and
networks chattels, there has been little (if any) judicial activity on this
front elsewhere. The US traces its common law ancestry to the United
Kingdom, and there remain many shared as well as similar causes of actions
and legal principles, including those pertaining to trespass to chattels. At
the same time, the Internet (or more generally, ‘cyberspace’) is geo-
graphically borderless and operates along similar technical principles
and social norms worldwide. The recent development of an action in
cyber-trespass in the US, based on the ‘ancient’3 common law doctrine of
trespass to chattels, is thus of interest to common lawyers worldwide, par-
ticularly given the comparative litigation silence elsewhere4.
Besides academic interest in doctrinal development, however, a further
point of interest arises in the context of cyber-trespass. The breadth of
the US cyber-trespass action points to a possible overlap between the tres-
pass cause of action and notions of ‘unauthorized access’ as the concept
is utilized in computer misuse statutes. Given the fact that the UK has had
a Computer Misuse Act for a number of years (as has other common law
jurisdictions) and the increasing adoption of such statutes (and the cor-
responding foundation of liability on acts of ‘unauthorized access’5) by
other countries, the implications of a broader and developing common
1 If not entirely meaningfully, in particular, there has been doubt cast on whether there is a distinct
area of law known as ‘cyberlaw’; see, e.g., Joseph H. Sommer, ‘Against Cyberlaw’, 15 Berkeley Tech. L. J.
1145 (2001), and Frank Easterbrook, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 207.
See also a response to Professor Easterbrook by Lawrence Lessig, ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach’, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1999.)
2 Meaning, generally, the common law of the United Kingdom and as followed in its former colonies
and territories.
3 See I. Trotter Hardy, ‘The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Websites’, 1996 J. Online L. art 7.
4 There also seems to be comparatively little academic commentary on this issue outside of the US, per-
haps understandably given the lack of case law even under traditional trespass to goods and/or ‘unau-
thorized access’ aprinciples. An analysis of the US cyber-trespass cases in the broader context of
proposing that the ‘rule’ in the English case of Wilkinson v Downton (commonly viewed as narrowly lim-
ited to the availability of a claim in tort for nervous shock) is wide enough to include acts that would have
been actionable under the older forms of action (such as trespass on the case) is, however, provided by
John Adams in ‘Trespass in a Digital Environment’, (2002) I.P.Q. 1. This argument is discussed further
infra.
5 See Kerr, infra n 84 and Schjolberg, infra n 70; for the present, the reader should note that the phrase
‘unauthorized access’ is used to cover other terms and phrases also used in such statutes, e.g., ‘exceeding
authorized access’, ‘access without right’, ‘access without authority’, and so on.
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law doctrine of cyber-trespass, beyond the boundaries (such as they are)
of tort, necessitate further attention.
This article is thus broadly divided into two Parts. Part I highlights the
reasons for the evolution of the cyber-trespass action in the US, noting
salient differences between a trespass to chattels under US law and ‘tradi-
tional’ English common law. Part II notes the overlap between cyber-
trespass (a civil action) and ‘unauthorized access’ (commonly a criminal
act under several forms of computer misuse legislation6), with an eye
toward analyzing how the comparatively more numerous US cases on this
issue7 might impact interpretation of the phrase in the UK and elsewhere,
and vice versa.
2 The Development of Cyber-Trespass in the 
US and Its Implications for Other Common 
Law Jurisdictions
2.1 Back to the English Common Law: Brief Notes on the 
‘Traditional’ Doctrine of Trespass to Chattels
It may first be useful to distinguish between various forms of, and usages
of the word, ‘trespass’. Legally speaking, trespass could mean the tradi-
tional forms of action dictated by the nature of the writ upon which the
action lay: in English law, the distinction here lies between a ‘writ of tres-
pass’ and a ‘writ of trespass on the case’ (or, more briefly and commonly,
‘trespass’ and ‘case’.) The importance of this distinction to cyber-trespass
lies in the fact that an action in trespass was actionable per se where tres-
pass on the case required proof of damage; the implication of this will be
further discussed below. The second distinction to be made with respect
to the word ‘trespass’ as regards a person’s property is that trespass can be
of two different kinds; viz., trespass to land (real property) or trespass to
goods (chattels.) As will be seen in the discussion of recent US case law
(below), this distinction, at least in terms of the damage requirement,
seems less significant in the realm of trespass to goods in English law.
The law of cyber-trespass, as developed in the US courts, is basically an
application of the general principles relating to trespass to chattels. While
it would have been helpful to look to the English common law to see if
these principles are similar, and hence could inform both the likelihood
as well as the nature of the development of an action in cyber-trespass by
6 Interestingly, however, the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (the main federal law governing com-
puter misuse) contemplates and permits civil actions as well as criminal prosecutions. Certain of the
former type of cases will be discussed infra.
7 At least, in relation to the federal US law of ‘unauthorized access’ to computer systems: see the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.)
MARY W. S. WONG
93
common law courts outside of the US, there are few English case author-
ities, and (perhaps correspondingly) relatively sparse academic and text-
book discussions of its scope and potential development8. For purposes of
the present discussion, it would be helpful to set out some of the basic
parameters and principles behind the English law of trespass to chattels.
A useful starting point is the question whether, under English law, an
action in trespass to goods is actionable per se (i.e., without the need for
any damage to have been caused by the act of trespass.) Although the cur-
rent editors of Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts and Winfield &
Jolowicz on Tort are of the opinion that, under English law, trespass to
goods is actionable per se9, other authors do not take such a clear stance10.
Winfield & Jolowicz note, in addition, that where the interference is unin-
tentional, actual damage may be required for policy reasons. Margaret
Brazier argues in Street on Torts that, for consistency with most prior law
and in accordance with general principles of trespass, a trespass to goods
ought to be actionable per se11.
The possibility that trespass to goods is actionable per se under English
law can be traced back to the distinction between trespass and case, as
highlighted earlier. An action in trespass, in contrast to an action on the
case, was actionable per se; the only requirements for such an action were
basically that the injury12 complained of was both ‘forcible’ – meaning
physical interference with another’s person or property – and ‘direct’ –
meaning immediate and not merely consequential13. Thus, where dam-
age is the ‘gist’ of the action in case, it was not so for trespass14.
Although the paucity of English cases on trespass to goods has not com-
pelled the resolution of the damage requirement under English law, in
the US, the issue has not only raised some difficult questions, it can and
8 See, e.g., R.F.V. Heuston and R.A. Buckley, Salmond.& Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed., Sweet &
Maxwell: 1996.) Margaret Brazier also covers similar ground, fairly comprehensively and at similar
length, in Street on Torts (8th ed., Butterworths: 1988.) In Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (15th ed., Sweet &
Maxwell: 1998), W.V.H. Rogers also discusses the origin of these actions and describes trespass to goods
fairly thoroughly, if briefly, as do Markesinis and Deakin, in Tort Law (4th ed., Oxford University Press:
1999.)
9 Salmond & Heuston state that ‘A trespass to goods is actionable per se without any proof of actual
damage. Any unauthorized touching . . . is actionable at the suit of the possessor of it, even though no
harm ensues’ (at 95, citing dicta in Leitch v Leydon [1931] AC 90.) Winfield & Jolowicz assert this principle
slightly less generally, stating that ‘[d]espite the fact that trespass is actionable per se, there is some author-
ity to the effect that trespass to goods requires proof of some damage [though] the general view of text-
book writers is to the contrary’ (at 585-6.)
10 See, e.g., Markesinis and Deakin, who write (at 407) that ‘[i]t is not altogether clear whether liability
is based on damage or whether the tort is actionable per se. It may be possible to distinguish between
deliberate touchings, which are actionable per se, and unintended or careless acts of touching, which
require damage.’
11 See Street on Torts, supra n 8, at 60.
12 Meaning the actionable wrong (or the act complained of) and not the damage or loss caused and
suffered.
13 Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts, supra n 8, at 4–7.
14 Ibid.
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has also served as a form of limitation on the type and number of cases
that can be brought within the cyber-trespass doctrine. Absent such a
requirement in English law, it could be that a potentially significant limit-
ing factor would be lacking should the English law on trespass in cyber-
space develop along similar lines as the US. Further, if trespass to goods is
considered actionable per se under English law, the lack of a limiting fac-
tor (such as a damage requirement) could militate against the develop-
ment of a broad doctrine of cyber-trespass outside of the US. In either
case, the issue whether trespass to chattels requires damage (and proof
thereof) in order to be actionable would, if it continues unresolved under
English law but cases alleging cyber-trespass begin to make their way
through the English and other common law courts, cause greater prac-
tical difficulty than it has hitherto. As a strictly common law development,
the existence and scope of the tort of trespass to goods, as applicable to
cyberspace, will fall to be determined in the courts. Given the recognition
of such a claim by the US courts, the deliberations of an English (or other
common law) court faced with such a claim should be closely watched by
both US and non-US lawyers.
Another noteworthy point for purposes of the current discussion is that
under English law, various acts in relation to goods have now been
‘folded’ into the concept of ‘wrongful interference’ under the Torts
(Interference with Goods) Act 1977. Although the Act does not change
the substantive English law on the various torts relating to interference
with goods and interests therein15, and thus prior case law on conversion,
trespass and other such actions continue to be relevant, it does attempt to
rationalize the various remedies available in such causes of action16. Sec-
tion 3 of the Act provides for remedies that consist either of delivery of
the goods (or payment with reference to the value thereof) and conse-
quential damages, or for damages. This confirms the prevailing notion,
up to recently at least, that trespass to and other interferences with goods
(chattels) concerned physical (tangible) goods and actual physical move-
ment, dispossession or other similar activities relating thereto. The idea
that such interference could occur in cyberspace – through the sending
of electronic signals to computers – was probably so remote as to be non-
existent at the time (1977.) In just twenty years, however, a US court
would be faced with precisely that issue, and have to consider whether or
not such an act could amount to trespass to chattels under US common
15 Except for abolishing the action in detinue; the Act now uses the term ‘wrongful interference’ as a
comprehensive phrase for all torts affecting dispossession, interferences and other interests in goods,
including conversion.
16 The Act has been described by Winfield & Jolowicz, supra n 8, as ‘a piecemeal attempt to deal with cer-
tain deficiencies in the common law [arising from the ‘long survival and overlap of a number of different
heads of liability] and is in no way a code governing interference with goods.’ In the same passage, the
authors assert that trespass remains ‘essentially a wrong to possession’.
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law principles17. It will therefore be interesting to observe how an English
court will deal with the issue whether or not electronic interferences can
be considered sufficiently tangible (physical) so as to qualify as a trespass
to a chattel (e.g., a computer.)
2.2 Trespass to Chattels in the US: the Road to Cyber-trespass
Under § 217 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts18, a trespass to chattels
is committed where a person intentionally dispossesses another person of
the chattel, or uses or intermeddles19 with a chattel in the other’s posses-
sion. Liability arises, however, only if (a) the other person has in fact been
dispossessed of the chattel, or (b) the intermeddling caused harm to the
other’s ‘materially valuable interest’ in the physical condition, value or
quality of the chattel, or (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chat-
tel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or
to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected
interest20. In other words, an interference with a chattel that does not cause
harm may technically be a form of trespass, but does not give rise to a
legally recoverable claim even if the act was done intentionally. In this
sense, trespass to chattels under US law has evolved so as to be distinct from
conversion (which historically required that intangible interests be
reflected in something tangible), as well as from a trespass to land (which is
actionable per se)21. As such, the tort deals, first, with interferences that are
‘not sufficiently important to be classed as conversion [which would] com-
pel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing with which he has inter-
fered. Trespass to chattels survives today, in other words, largely as a little
brother of conversion.’22 Secondly, a harmless trespass to chattel under the
US law does not give rise to a claim for nominal damages. Instead, accord-
ing to the Restatement, ‘[s]ufficient legal protection of the possessor’s
interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to
use reasonable force to protect his possession against even harmless inter-
ference.’23 These statements of principle seem to entrench and reinforce
the conceptual distinction (and differing requirements of liability) among
conversion, trespass to land and trespass to chattel.
17 In CompuServe, Inc. v Cyber-Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997.)
18 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965.)
19 ‘Intermeddling’ means ‘intentionally bringing about a physical contact with the chattel’: see ibid, § 217.
20 § 218, ibid.
21 According to § 217, comment (a) to the Restatement, where an interference causes no harm either
to the chattel itself or to any other ‘legally protected interest of the possessor, [it] affords the possessor a
privilege to use force to defend his interest in its exclusive possession.’ § 218, comment (e), further states
that ‘[t]he interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar interest of a possessor
of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with
the chattel. In order that an actor who interferes with another’s chattel may be liable, his conduct must
affect some other and more important interest of the possessor.’
22 Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed., 1984), § 15, p 92.
23 § 218, comment (e.)
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The first major US case to apply the traditional doctrine of trespass to
chattels to cyberspace activity was the 1997 decision by the Southern Dis-
trict Court of Ohio in CompuServe, Inc. v Cyber-Promotions, Inc.24 The court
relied on the earlier (1996) California Court of Appeals case of Thrifty-Tel v
Bezenek25, where the Court held that unauthorized use of long-distance tele-
phone services could constitute a trespass to chattels; the electronic signals
that were generated by a practice that came to be known as ‘phreaking’26
were thought ‘sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action’.
The CompuServe case saw an Internet service provider (CompuServe) argue
successfully that a trespass to chattels action lay against a defendant who
had transmitted ‘spam’27 to users of CompuServe’s network and services.
The electronic signals thus transmitted constituted the ‘intermeddling’ (to
CompuServe’s computer system) required by the law, and though no
actual dispossession had occurred, it was not necessary as long as there was
an impairment to the value of the chattel in question28. In addition, the loss
of customer goodwill was a form of damage in that it constituted a thing in
which CompuServe had a ‘legally protected interest.’
There have been many commentaries on the CompuServe case, and the
subsequent US cases that essentially adopted its reasoning (including
eBay, Inc. v Bidder’s Edge, Inc.29, Register.com, Inc., v Verio, Inc.30, and Intel
Corp. v Hamidi31),32 and it is not proposed to rehash them here, although
some of the more significant implications of these decisions for the
24 Supra n 17.
25 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
26 In this case, commencing with the manual entry of randomly-guessed authorization codes followed
subsequently by the use of software to automate searches for those codes.
27 Bulk unsolicited electronic mail messages.
28 Which the court found based on the fact that any value CompuServe realized from its computer
equipment was ‘wholly derived from the extent to which that equipment can serve its subscriber base.’ In
addition, damage to the value of the chattel could be found in the burden the ‘spam’ presented to the
system and the resources employed to deal with it.
29 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
30 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d 356 F. 3d 393.
31 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (2002), rev’d 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (2003.)
32 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, ‘The Trouble With Trespass’, J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 1 (Vol. 3, 1998),
Edward W. Chang, ‘Bidding on Trespass: eBay, Inc. v Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and the Abuse of Trespass Theory
in Cyberspace Law’, 29 AIPLA Q. J. 445 (2001), Steve Fischer, ‘When Animals Attack: Spiders and Internet
Trespass’, 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 139 (2001), Richard Warner, ‘Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on
the Internet’, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 117 (2002), Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, ‘Spiders and Crawlers and Bots, Oh My:
The Economic Efficiency and Public Policy of Online Contracts that Restrict Data Collection’, 2002 Stan.
Tech. L. Rev. 3, Laura Quilter, ‘The Continuing Evolution of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels’, 17 Berkeley
Tech. L. J. 421 (2002), R. Clifton Merrell, ‘Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet’, 80 Wash. U. L.
Q. 675 (2002), and Richard A. Epstein, ‘Cybertrespass’, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (2003.) Academic comment
on the California Supreme Court decision in Intel v Hamidi include George H. Fibbe, ‘Screen-Scraping
and Harmful Cybertrespass After Intel’, 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1011 (2004), Patty M. DeGaetano, ‘Intel Corp. v
Hamidi: Private Property, Keep Out – The Unworkable Definition of Injury for a Trespass to Chattels
Claim in Cyberspace’, 40 Cal. W. L. Rev. 355 (2004), Steven Kam, ‘Intel Corp. v Hamidi: Trespass to Chat-
tels and a Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance’, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 427 (2004) and a comment in the Recent
Development section of the Fall 2003 issue of the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, ‘Trespass to
Chattels and the Internet: Intel v Hamidi’, 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 283 (2003.)
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purpose of the present discussion will be noted. Essentially, most com-
mentators agree that this line of decisions – culminating in the Intel case
(discussed below) – heralded not just an unexpected judicial recognition
of the utility to the Internet age of an old form of action, it also demon-
strated the flexibility and breadth of the trespass to chattels claim33. Cer-
tainly, by applying Thrifty-Tel and allowing recovery where there was no
physical damage to the chattel in question, the CompuServe decision
opened the door to wider claims for cyber-trespass than was probably and
previously thought possible under traditional trespass rules. This develop-
ment has taken place in parallel with the ability of website, database and
other information possessors to limit access through contracts and other
legal mechanisms, such that there seems to be a growing number and
scope of legal tools for access control in cyberspace.
It must, however, be stated that there are several policy reasons in favor of
allowing recovery under a trespass to chattels claim by the plaintiffs in most
of the cases decided in the US so far. These reasons revolve largely around
two factors: (a) the commercial risks and realities of Internet-related busi-
nesses, and (b) the lack of an adequate legal remedy for unfair competition
in this realm. For example, in eBay v Bidder’s Edge, it may be argued that a
website provider such as eBay ought to have legal recourse to exclude
unwanted activity from its website, at least where such activity can in some
objective way be viewed as socially inappropriate. In eBay’s case, a palpable
sense of ‘free riding’ and hence unfair competition will almost inevitably
arise if Bidder’s Edge (or similar aggregators or competitors) were permit-
ted to continue spidering, scraping and otherwise gathering information
that would lead to a decrease in the utility of eBay’s site and services (since
the information on current bid prices, available items and so on would now
be available on non-eBay sites) and the overall value of the user experience
(since the excitement and anticipation of checking on current information
would not depend solely, or even primarily, on accessing eBay.) As a matter
of fact, it can be said that the user experience on websites such as eBay’s is
almost inextricably tied to the ‘real time’ anxiety and challenge of bidding,
outbidding, timing and strategy. As such, where information crucial to this
experience is readily available on more than one unrelated website, it can
be argued that the user experience is in some way thus diluted. This would
be aside from, though related to, any direct (including, in some potential
competitive situations, financial) and legitimately detrimental effects on
33 For example, eBay claimed successfully against the online auction aggregator Bidder’s Edge, where
the latter had conducted unauthorized, regular, ‘real-time’ automated searches (and consequent results
gathering) of eBay’s auction listings by utilizing ‘spidering’ search technology. The parties had previously
attempted to negotiate a license for such activity, and eBay had also engaged in technological ‘self-help’
by utilizing robot exclusion headers to detect electronic robot activity. Register.com claimed successfully
against Verio, who had used a robot to search Register.com’s publicly-accessible WHOIS registrant data-
base, and then sent unsolicited emails to those registrants offering Verio’s competing services.
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eBay’s services or business (such as network slowdown or capacity issues,
whether actual or potential, as acknowledged in the eBay case itself.)
In addition, where the plaintiff may have first attempted to rely on ‘self-
help’ mechanisms (such as technological blocks and tracing of the
alleged trespassory acts, as in CompuServe and eBay, or the attempts by
Intel’s employees to block Hamidi’s email messages in Intel), the plaintiff
can be said to have turned to litigation only because such ‘self-help’
failed34. Similarly, the plaintiff may be said to have used good faith
attempts to craft a solution without resorting to the absolutism of assert-
ing her property rights, such as where a negotiated contractual solution
to the alleged trespassory activity was attempted (as in eBay.) In such
instances, it may be difficult to accuse the plaintiffs of attempting to
overly monopolize or aggressively control their respective ‘corners’ of
cyberspace. Further, where the plaintiff has a legitimate online business
model (whether that be providing Internet communications services
(CompuServe), an online auction community (eBay), or domain name
services (Register.com), it may be justifiable to rely on whatever legal doc-
trines are available and applicable, as control mechanisms over access to
its website and information in ways not necessarily hostile to the growth
or usage of the Internet, in that these control mechanisms represent only
a choice by such entities to exclude certain actors and acts, but do not
dictate the choices open to other entities, who may elect not to assert
their property rights in the same way35.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that it would be unfair to
deprive other legitimate online businesses of opportunities to compete
freely, where this is the price of allowing others to assert their property
rights in cyberspace36. For example, Bidder’s Edge was arguably not the
archetypal ‘free rider’, first because it did attempt to negotiate a license
with eBay, and secondly because its form of business (providing conven-
ient consumer services and information through collecting, aggregating
and organizing a huge mass of consumer-relevant online data) can be
said to be just as legitimate and useful to the growth and usage of the
Internet as eBay’s. From this perspective, it may be difficult to distinguish
between a company like Bidder’s Edge and other online service providers
such as search engines, or even online activities such as linking37. This
34 The fact that the plaintiff in a case may first have relied on ‘self-help’ mechanisms, including techno-
logical tools such as robot exclusion headers and ‘spam’ filters, can also be taken to show that the plain-
tiff has thereby used her best efforts to defend her chattel’s ‘inviolability’, in that the ‘self-help’
constituted the ‘reasonable force’ to defend her property required by §218 of the Restatement.
35 See McGowan, infra n 59.
36 Particularly where such proprietary assertions can be viewed as an expansion of property rights: see
discussion infra.
37 See the amicus brief filed by 28 law professors in the eBay case in support of Bidder’s Edge, filed
June 22, 2000, available online at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/amicus/biddersedge_v_ebay.pdf (page last
accessed June 16, 2005.)
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argument would, however, favor a different outcome only in the eBay
case, probably not CompuServe, and possibly not Register.com. In Com-
puServe, the defendant was engaged in ‘spamming’, arguably a socially
undesirable and doubtless a ‘free riding’ activity. In Register.com, although
Verio’s main business was undoubtedly legitimate38, its access and use of
the WHOIS database could arguably be said to be somewhat opportunis-
tic and perhaps even marginally deceptive to the recipients of their
emails (such emails could themselves constitute a mild form of ‘spam’.)
Further, it can be argued that allowing parties such as CompuServe and
eBay (however desirable corporate ‘netizens’ they may be) to succeed on
a trespass claim represents a setback for proponents of open access to
information on the Internet and dampens legitimate (and desired) com-
petition in terms of electronic commerce, including increasing transac-
tion costs39. In other words, extending trespass to chattels in the way that
the US courts have done results in ‘over-propertization’ of the Internet,
which is largely a public communications resource, the growth and suc-
cess of which lies substantially in its open nature and the ‘network effects’
thus created40. Thus one important question is whether encouraging
(and protecting) Internet-based business activities through propertiza-
tion is worth the ‘cost’ and risk of such property (chattels) owners ‘fenc-
ing off’ their own ‘corners’ of cyberspace, based as it is on a cause of
action that historically was developed to protect physical property. This
concern is exarcerbated by the fear that such ‘fencing off’ will perpetuate
a fragmentary, even ‘anti-commons’, approach to the Internet. This ques-
tion raises implications beyond the law of trespass, particularly as regards
the fact that the relatively easy extension of trespass notions to cyberspace
can be traced, in part, to the fairly lax use by the US courts of the term
‘trespass’ and the different types of property associated with it. This judi-
cial casualness has fanned academic discussion of the possibility that
cyber-trespass developed in the way it did in part because of a perception
of ‘cyberspace-as-place’41. The full implications of such a view are beyond
38 Its primary business is not domain name registration but website hosting and other Internet-related
services such as access and collocation: see http://www.verio.com (page last accessed August 1, 2005.)
39 Supra n 37.
40 See Burk, supra n 32, at 23–28 and the sources cited therein.
41 Michael J. Madison, ‘Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet’, 44 B. C. L. Rev. 33 (2003), and
Burk, supra n 32. See also Dan Hunter, ‘Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticom-
mons’, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 439 (2003), Mark A. Lemley, ‘Place and Cyberspace’, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 521 (2003),
Jacqueline Lipton, ‘Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: Property in Information and Information Systems’,
35 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 235 (2003), and Ronnie Cohen and Janine S. Hiller, ‘Towards a Theory of
Cyberplace: A Proposal for a New Legal Framework’, 10 Rich. J. L. & Tech. 2 (2003.) The arguments put
forth by some of these authors are analyzed in the context of trespass by David McGowan, ‘The Trespass
Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle’, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04–5. Professor
McGowan also discusses Professor Burk’s analysis of the real property/personal property reasoning in the
cyber-trespass cases, and contends that many of these authors were not correct in asserting that the courts
in the cyber-trespass cases conflated real and personal property principles. For an early proposal to apply
trespass theory and property rights to websites, see I. Trotter Hardy, supra n 3.
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the scope of this paper, but it must be noted as a relevant consideration in
any instance where a court (or for that matter a legislature) is called upon
to determine the applicability and extent of private property rights in
cyberspace. In such a case, the need to balance such private rights with the
public interest in open access must surely be a relevant policy factor.
Whether couched in terms of real or personal property rights, one risk of
a pro-’propertization’ stance is that the balance is tipped in favor of those
who control the means to communicate and the content available in
cyberspace. While this may be an overly-simplistic statement of the prob-
lem and its implications, it is not difficult to hypothesize that a person who
is inclined to view cyberspace as a distinct ‘place’ (and by association, acts
and things within that space) may also find it easier to use real property
analogies and metaphors in any argument or decision emanating from a
cyberspace problem. Such a tendency would not, by itself, dictate the legal
outcome of a case, just as it would not necessarily cloud that person’s ana-
lytical framework or reasoning; it is only when it leads to ‘tunnel vision’
that the ‘cyberspace-as-place’ perception can be ‘outcome-determinative’
without taking into account other perspectives and possibilities42.
Another relevant policy factor in some of the cyber-trespass cases is that
the trespassory acts (such as in eBay and Register.com) were directed
against publicly-available information and databases. This fact may make
a difference from the perspective of determining whether or not it is per-
missible for ‘owners’ to ‘fence off’ cyberspace; it also raises the question,
discussed further below, as to the actual ‘property’ that was trespassed
against and consequently harmed, and whether the trespass claim can
succeed in protecting these interests where other property rights fail to
do so. Finally, there is at least one US case that considered the ‘taking of
factual information from a public source . . . not a trespass’43, though
unfortunately the court’s analysis of the trespass doctrine was fairly
sparse, and the argument failed ultimately because the plaintiff failed to
prove the requisite harm to the chattel in question (a website from which
the defendant extracted factual information about forthcoming events
through the use of spiders.)
Without revisiting the ‘cyberspace-as-place’ metaphor, the notion that
trespass to chattels could apply – without much need for adaptation – to
42 See Orin S. Kerr, ‘The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law’, 91 Geo. L. J. 357 (2003) and Brett M.
Frischmann, ‘The Prospect of Reconciling Internet and Cyberspace’, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 205 (2003), for
a thought-provoking analysis of the ‘outcome-determinative’ nature of differing perspectives of the Inter-
net; viz., the ‘internal’ (subjective to the user who is enabled and affected by it) and the ‘external’ (view-
ing the Internet as essentially a tangible communications medium.) Professor Frischmann suggests that
both perspectives provide different but accurate, and thus ‘descriptively valid’, snapshots of the facts and
interests in a cyberlaw dispute.
43 Ticketmaster Corp. v Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. 2000.) The court appar-
ently also thought that if the act constituted a trespass under state law, it would be caught by the pre-emp-
tion provisions of the US Copyright Act.
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cyberspace, based entirely on the fact that a chattel belonging to the
plaintiff was involved at some point during the defendant’s activities, is at
first blush somewhat discomfiting. It is true that the defendant’s act of
trespass cannot take place in the absence of the chattel; however, even
though the presence of the chattel may be a necessary pre-condition to
the doing of the act complained of, this fact gives rise to two problems:
first, the chattel (and damage thereto) seems only incidental to the inten-
tion behind the act (i.e., the act was not necessarily directed at or against
the chattel, which was merely the means to achieve a particular purpose.)
Secondly, the real damage that is caused by the act generally is not to the
chattel or any possessory interest of the plaintiff’s therein, inasmuch as it
lies in the defendant being able to, e.g., compete effectively with the
plaintiff, or acquire commercially valuable data or information, thus
injuring some (usually) commercial interest of the plaintiff’s.
The question of intention may not, however, be a major problem
within the scope of the action of trespass to chattels. Under the US law of
trespass to chattels, the requisite intention is present ‘when an act is done
for the purpose of using or otherwise intermeddling with a chattel or with
knowledge that such an intermeddling will, to a substantial certainty, res-
ult from the act. It is not necessary that the actor should know or have
reason to know that such intermeddling is a violation of the possessory
rights of another.’44 It can be argued that a ‘spammer’ or other ‘intruder’
onto a website or into a computer network does that act at least with
‘knowledge that . . . intermeddling will, to a substantial certainty, result’
therefrom. Despite academic doubt about the presence of the requisite
intention in the US cyber-trespass cases45, it is arguable that the Restate-
ment comments are wide enough to accommodate situations where the
defendant may not have intended (whether solely or even primarily) to
‘intermeddle’ with the plaintiff’s chattel, so long as she committed the
trespassory act with the knowledge that some interference with the chat-
tel in question will take place, and such interference is deemed by the law
to be sufficient to constitute a trespass. Under English law, there has not
been exhaustive judicial or academic discussion over the definition of
‘intention’ in the realm of torts, in recent times probably because of the
rapid growth of the law of negligence, overlaid on top of the fact that his-
torically it was the forms of action that dictated the nature of a claim. It
has been suggested, however, that recklessness as to the effect of one’s
44 Comment (c) to § 217 of the Restatement.
45 Madison, supra n 41. Professor Madison notes that the courts in the cyber-trespass cases have not
highlighted the requirement of intention in the tort (which he points out is a rather ‘ambiguous’ con-
cept), but have, rather, focused on a fairly loose interpretation of the damage caused by the defendant’s
activity constituting ‘intermeddling’ and the plaintiff’s lack of consent to such activity. Although he sug-
gests that the courts may have largely treated intention as merely a threshold distinguishing knowingness
from negligence, he notes, further, that this has had the effect of conflating trespass to chattels with tres-
pass to land.
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actions, being sufficient for a trespass to land, should apply to all the
forms of trespass46, although whether this will constitute yet another
divergence from the US law in this area could be an issue, since the US
law requires ‘substantial certainty’ that intermeddling will result from the
act47, which seems to set a higher standard. Regardless, however, of these
issues and differences, the general point remains that it seems odd to
include the kind of activity that more resembles some kind of unfair com-
petition (whether or not actionable under this heading) in a tort that
emphasizes possession and ownership of a physical thing.
On the issue of damage, although the chattel at issue in the cases under
discussion could have been damaged in some way (whether as to its physical
condition, quality or value), any such damage was not in any way done to the
chattel as a thing, in and of itself. This was a point made by the California
Supreme Court in Intel v Hamidi, and as such will be discussed further
below48. For now, it will suffice to note that the tort of trespass to chattels
revolves around an act done to the chattel itself, or more generally, the pos-
sessory interest in the chattel, such that the damage requirement (to the
extent it exists in a particular jurisdiction) ought logically to be found in dam-
age to the chattel or possession thereof. To loosen these ‘connectors’ would
risk confusing the acts done, and/or damage caused, to the chattel (the sub-
ject of the tort) with acts done, and/or damage caused, to other ‘things’ – in
the cases under discussion, largely intangibles – associated with the chattel
(for example, intangible information in the form of computerized data is
embodied in the form of code and programs residing on a computer.)
In this regard, a distinction can be made between ‘cyberspace-as-
place’49 and ‘information-as-thing’, which the courts for the most part
seem not to have done clearly. The fact is that the interferences in the
cases in question were ultimately directed toward intangibles, i.e., the
data or information (auction listings, database entries, email addresses)
residing within or on a tangible computer server. In other words, it might
be more theoretically plausible – if not necessarily easier – to view the
databases and information being spidered, crawled and gathered, as the
requisite chattel, rather than hinge the tort on the ‘real’ (i.e., tangible)
chattel, viz., the computers they were stored on. This analysis would set
the ‘spam’ cases apart from the automated search cases, but there seems
little policy reason for not doing so, particularly given the increasing
46 Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, supra n 8, at 50. The example given is of a man who throws his coffee dregs
out of his office window knowing that people may be passing by underneath it.
47 Ibid.
48 Before the California Supreme Court overturned the Appeals Court in Intel, a similar point had been
made by Professor Dan Burk in relation to the Appeals Court decision in Intel and the earlier cases; see
Burk, supra n 32.
49 Whether the ‘place’ is defined as that arena where computers, networks, servers, routers and so on con-
nect people and enable their interaction, or as that ‘virtual world’ where interactions still cause the kind of
tangible reactions and consequences as the ‘real world’ with which it is often compared and analogized.
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occurrence and costs incurred by ‘spam’. The result in these two catego-
ries of cases might not be dissimilar, in any case, and even by a different
reasoning process (though ultimately still within the same tort) as the
‘spam’ cases would fit more easily (especially as regards the damage
caused and the link between the interference complained of and the
damage) within the doctrinal rubric of trespass to chattels.
It seems, however, as if the US courts in the cases to date have pre-
ferred the alternative route of borrowing from cases and principles gov-
erning real property trespasses, rather than identifying and declaring that
personal property principles apply to ‘information-as-thing.’ The fact that
it seems natural and human to consider ‘cyberspace-as-place’ could
explain the courts’ effortless borrowings of real property principles in
this way50 such that there is little conceptual difficulty with allowing recov-
ery under trespass to chattels when the interference was non-physical in
nature (at least, not to a significantly substantial extent)51, and where the
damage to the chattel was either incidental, or unrelated to its principal
physical characteristics or functions (a point emphasized by the Court in
Intel.) Regardless, therefore, of whether the courts have been so deeply
mired in the metaphor of ‘cyberspace-as-place’ so as to conflate real and
personal property in cyberspace52, the dominance of a ‘property’ motif in
the cyber-trespass cases shows in the relative alacrity with which courts
have granted injunctions restraining further trespassory activity against
the plaintiff’s ‘property’, where the ‘property’ motif at play centered on
tangible property in the form of computers and associated equipment.
Where the requisite damage has been found in injury to a broadly gener-
alized ‘value’53 of the chattel rather than in an impairment to its physical
condition or quality, it would seem as though the interests that the courts
are protecting are somewhat distant from the relatively narrow basis of the
tort, which essentially concerns intentional dispossession or interference
50 Some judges do distinguish between real and personal property, but acknowledge that, e.g., ongoing
trespasses to computer systems can be ‘more akin to the traditional notion of a trespass to real property
than the traditional notion of a trespass to chattels because even though it is ongoing, it will probably
never amount to a conversion’: per the court in eBay v Bidder’s Edge, supra n 29.
51 As has been pointed out by some commentators, while cases prior to and relied on by CompuServe
and subsequent decisions have found that microscopic particles and sound waves constituted trespass,
they were mostly cases of trespass to land. As such, this serves as an example of the easy borrowing from
real property doctrine in this area. Although it may be possible and even necessary that certain tiny and/
or intangible intrusions could be sufficiently substantial (e.g., by repeated occurrence) to sustain a tres-
pass to chattels action (the example that springs to mind would naturally be ‘spam’), the point remains
that the application of real property-based reasoning should be only where appropriate, and within the
conceptual framework of the trespass torts.
52 See McGowan, supra n 41 and the authors whose ‘metaphor claims’ he discusses.
53 In the main, pre-Intel, damage had been found in what amounted, basically, to the commercial value
of the chattel, measured by its value to the normal business functions of its possessor rather than the mar-
ket value of the chattel itself; e.g., the potential server and network overloads that could occur if the
defendant’s acts remained unchecked and undeterred (e.g., eBay), the loss of customer goodwill and use
of resources to deal with ‘spam’ (CompuServe.)
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with a physical thing such that the owner’s possession or use of the thing is
impaired in a way sufficiently significant as to warrant legal protection.
A related point is the fact that, in the cyber-trespass cases, the intangi-
bles toward which the interferences were directed tended to be data,
databases, information and listings that, while commercially valuable, are
unprotected (and in many cases unprotectable) under intellectual prop-
erty and related laws. Unlike the United Kingdom (UK) and the rest of
the European Union (EU), the US has no generic database protection
law. Under general copyright principles, data and factual information
cannot be protected by copyright law. Where such information is com-
mercially valuable, legal rights are conferred only by means of trade
secret and related laws (such as any protection provided by the action in
breach of confidence in the UK.) Although it was not necessarily the case
that any of the plaintiffs in the cyber-trespass cases were relying on tres-
pass as a last resort, it must be said that the effect of extending trespass to
these cases could – even inadvertently – amount to granting legal protec-
tion over intangibles that would otherwise not be protected. It is true that
the legal protections so conferred exist only insofar as the intangible
resides on a tangible thing that is interfered with, and as such are concep-
tually and in scope different from obtaining actual rights in the intangi-
ble itself. The net practical effect, however, is fairly similar, in that the
owner (or at least person in control) of the intangible is able to control
the means, extent and duration of access to, and use of, that intangible,
and by whom. In light of the existence of database protection in the UK,
it could be that courts there and in other countries with similar protec-
tion would resist the extension of a trespass to chattels claim.
One fundamental question that can be asked in this regard is whether
or not trespass to chattel is, in fact, the correct legal principle to base
recovery on, in respect of unauthorized access and intrusive activity to
intangibles on the Internet. Various commentators have proposed other
legal rules that, for various reasons, might be more appropriate, such as
trespass to property (land)54, or even the doctrine of nuisance55. In the
comparative US/UK context, one commentator56 has suggested that the
US cyber-trespass cases could more properly have been framed as an
54 Hardy, supra n 3.
55 Burk, supra n 32.
56 Adams, supra n 4. He notes that the US courts ‘have rediscovered a powerful weapon which, understood
properly in its historical context, is capable of encompassing may objectionable Internet activities . . .’.
The premise for an action on the case in instances of cyber-trespass is drawn from, of all things, the ‘rule’
in the English case of Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 Q. B. 57, which has traditionally been formulated as a
narrow rule governing recovery in tort for nervous shock, and thereby classified by modern texts as a
‘residuary’ tort (Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, supra n 8.) Adams argues, however, that the contemporary
view of the case was broader and fit well into the ambit of an action on the case, which can be pressed
into action to deal with the sort of Internet-based activities that would not otherwise amount to trespass as
traditionally conceived.
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action on the case (following the old forms of action discussed above),
which permitted recovery for consequential damage caused by trespas-
sory acts that did not ‘rise’ to the level of an actionable trespass. What this
diversity of academic opinion shows is the clear need for the law to deal
with an increasing amount and different kinds of intrusive activity in
cyberspace, viz., whether for general policy, doctrinal and economic rea-
sons, a claim and recovery ought to be allowed, and if so, what branch or
principle of law would be the most appropriate medium for recovery. The
trespass to chattel claim as developed by the US courts has so far seemed
more of a ‘gap-filler’ than a logical and complete solution57.
Another relevant factor to consider in extending trespass to chattels to
cyberspace is the ability of an owner/possessor/controller of information
to augment or restrict another’s access to and use of that information by
the mechanism of contract. A contract can represent a set of mutually-
agreed rights of and limits to access and use of information, and several
of the cyber-trespass cases illustrate this. For instance, eBay and Bidder’s
Edge had actually entered into negotiations for a license, while Regis-
ter.com had sought to impose restrictions on the use of its customer data-
base. This issue raises considerations that reach into the realm of general
contract law as applied to different types of electronic and online
contracts58; in the present context, the point to note is that, assuming
57 See Adams, ibid, and Quilter, supra n 32.
58 These issues include the questions: (a) whether and how consent or assent to terms (or a legally
binding acceptance thereof) can be manifested in electronic contracts such as ‘clickwrap’ and ‘browsewrap’
contracts, (b) the problems posed by standard form contracts and ‘contracts of adhesion’ (or unfair and
unilaterally-imposed contractual terms), and (c) the enforceability of such contracts. There has been, to
date, only one UK case on these issues, in respect of when acceptance of the terms of a ‘shrinkwrap’
license took place: Beta Computers Europe Ltd v Adobe Systems Europe Ltd, 1996 FSR 367. In this area, as in
cyber-trespass, the US courts have seen far more litigation activity than elsewhere. See, e.g., Step-saver Data
Systems, Inc. v Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991), Pro CD, Incorporated v Matthew Zeidenberg and
Silken Mountain Web Services, Inc., 86 F. 3d. 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), Hill v Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F. 3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997), Hotmail Corp. v Van$ Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998), Brower v Gateway
2000 Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1st Dep’t 1998), M. A. Mortensen Co. v Timberline Software Corp., 970 P. 2d 803
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999), Caspi v. Microsoft Network, LLC, 732 A. 2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999),
Klocek v Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000), Register.com, Inc. v Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d
238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), iLan Sys., Inc. v NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002), and
Christopher Specht, John Gibson, Michael Fagan, Sean Kelly, Mark Gruber and Sherry Weindorf (individually and on
behalf of all others others similarly situated) v. Netscape Communications Corporation and America Online, Inc., 150
F.Supp.2d 585 (2001.) For just a few examples of the academic commentaries generated by these issues
and cases, see, e.g., Robert A. Hillman and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ‘Standard Form Contracting in the Elec-
tronic Age’, 77 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 429, Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. and William H. Daughtrey, Jr., ‘Adapting Contract
Law to Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions’, 26 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L. J.
215, Dan Streeter, ‘Into Contract’s Undiscovered Country: A Defense of Browse-Wrap Licenses’, 39 San
Diego L. Rev. 1363, James J. White, ‘Default Rules in Sales And The Myth of Contracting Out’, 48 Loy. L.
Rev. 53, Roger E. Schechter, ‘The Unfairness of Click-On Software Licenses’, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1735, Drew
Block, ‘Caveat Surfer: Recent Developments In The Law Surrounding Browse-Wrap Agreements, And
The Future of Consumer Interaction With Websites’, 14 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 227 and Melissa Robertson,
‘Is Assent Still A Prerequisite For Contract Formation In Today’s Economy?’ 78 WALR 265. Madison,
supra n 41, also discusses these issues and cases in the specific context of access control, together with
other mechanisms besides cyber-trespass, such as anti-circumvention technology.
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there are no difficulties with the substantive requirements of contract law
(such as offer, acceptance, notice and certainty), the owner of the sort of
chattels at issue in the cyber-trespass cases (and the information and
other property residing in and on them) may allow, extend, limit or pro-
hibit access to such information, chattels and property by way of
contract59. This point is further discussed below, in the context of the
meaning and scope of ‘unauthorized access.’
The line of US cases beginning with CompuServe can thus be said to have
effectively created a new (or at least broader and certainly updated) cause of
action for cyber-trespass, which not only liberalizes the traditional require-
ments for a trespass to chattels claim, but also positions it as a form of prop-
erty right that is (1) aside and different from any known species of
intellectual property; (2) separate from and in addition to contract (which
can impose restrictions on access by mutual agreement); and (3) without
the conventional limitations developed by these areas of law60. Given that, in
the appropriate case, intellectual property61 rights might be available to pro-
tect an intangible that is of some value to the owner, and that in many cases,
owners of information, databases and other intangibles can and do draw
‘fences’ around access to their ‘property’ by way of contract, the growth of
cyber-trespass as an alternative or additional legal means to protect intangi-
bles is significant. Taken together, these and other mechanisms62 that can
be used to control access to information and content can collectively give to
the owner/possessor/controller of intangibles a series of different but
effective legal rights by which to control access to these intangibles.
Before moving on to examine briefly the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Intel v Hamidi, one final point may be made on issues raised so
far by the present discussion. As alluded to previously, a deeper consider-
ation for the policy and competition concerns underlying the cyber-
trespass cases may in some instances point toward a different treatment of
and outcome for ‘spam’ cases such as CompuServe. ‘Spammers’ can be dis-
tinguished from legitimate competitors, in that their methods and aims
tend to demonstrate socially undesirable, ‘free riding’ and (sometimes)
distasteful behavior. In addition, it is not difficult to imagine that ‘spam’
and ‘spamming’, if unchecked, could lead to the kinds of server and network
overloads and slowdowns feared by the eBay court in respect of spiders.
Similarly, in non-‘spamming’ cases where the defendant’s actions may be
considered illegitimate in some way and can or will cause obvious harm to
59 See David McGowan, ‘Website Access: The Case for Consent’, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 341 (2003), argu-
ing that property rules and not liability rules ought to govern website access; website owners are deemed
to consent to any lawful use of that site, unless her choice to exclude (i.e., no consent) is notified to the user.
60 Supra n 37.
61 Such as copyright for original material, or even for some databases possessing the requisite amount
of originality. In the EU, databases can be protected under national laws implementing the sui generis
right created by the EU Database Directive of 1996 (Directive 96/9/EC.)
62 See, e.g., the situations, cases and proposals discussed in Madison, supra n 41.
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a plaintiff’s commercial or other legitimate interest, a trespass to chattels
claim may well be a useful, perhaps even the only, legal means available
to restrain further activity (e.g., through the award of an injunction.)63 In
many jurisdictions, some such practices have begun to be regulated by
anti-‘spamming’ legislation64. As such, the need for a common law solu-
tion to ‘spamming’ may well be much less pressing. Ironically, then, it
would still be the cases which do not concern ‘spam’ (including mass
emailing cases that do not amount to ‘spam’, such as Intel v Hamidi), that
remain in need of a legal remedy. The California Supreme Court’s judg-
ment in Intel should be considered in the context of this existing need.
2.3 The State of Play After 2003 and the Aftermath 
of Intel v Hamidi
In June 2003, the California Supreme Court issued its decision on the
appeal in the Intel case. While accepting the applicability of trespass to chat-
tels to cyberspace, in that the Court did not question either the doctrine or
the prior case law, the majority’s decision had the effect of reining in some
of the potentially broader implications of the action, primarily as regards
the kinds of damage that would be actionable thereunder. As such, the
Court’s decision is significant also for providing a potential glimpse into
how future cases of cyber-trespass could be treated by the US courts.
The Court emphasized the need to show damage in order to succeed in
such an action, and distinguished the case before it from CompuServe, eBay
and other precedent cases on that basis. In this respect, the Court contrasted
the scant evidence of damage presented by Intel65 with the damage shown in
the prior cases. Because the emails sent by Hamidi did not rise to the volume
of ‘spam’ (as was the case in CompuServe), and because Intel could not show
that its computer systems had in any way been, or could potentially be, bur-
dened or impaired in their ‘intended function’ by Hamidi’s actions (as in
eBay, however minimally or potentially), the Court concluded that Intel’s real
complaint was about the contents of Hamidi’s email communications, and
not the effect of his sending them on its personal property.
63 It should be noted that, besides CompuServe, the US courts have also applied trespass to chattels analysis
to other cases of ‘spamming’ brought by another Internet service provider: see, e.g., America On Line, Inc. v
LCGM, Inc. 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E. D. Va. 1998) and America On Line, Inc. v IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E. D. Va.
1998). Since this paper was completed, US courts have (in preliminary rulings denying defendant’s motion
to dismiss) indicated that trespass to chattel may be a ground for action against unwanted installation of
‘spyware’ on a home computer: see, e.g., Stephen Sotelo v DirectRevenue LLC, No. 05 C 2562 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29,
2005) and Thomas Kerrins v Intermix Media, Inc. No. 2: 05-cv-05408-RGK-SS (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2006).
64 In the US, the CAN-SPAM Act was signed into federal law by President Bush in 2003. There has been
a growing number of articles analyzing the need for and efficacy of this and similar legislation; for a few
examples, see Elizabeth A. Alongi, ‘Has the U.S. Canned Spam?’, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 263 (2004), Adam
Mossoff, ‘Spam – Oy, What a Nuisance!’, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 625 (2004), and Adam Zitter, ‘Good Laws
for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited Solicitations’, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2767 (2004.)
65 This consisted of annoyance and upset on the part of some recipients of Hamidi’s anti-Intel emails,
and employee time spent in dealing with them.
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The emphasis which the Court placed on the damage requirement shows
(as mentioned previously) a potentially large divergence between the US
and English common law of trespass to chattels. Interestingly, the Court
highlighted the fact that the origin of the tort differed in the US from
England, based as it was in the latter on the historical procedures of the
forms of action, and distinguished it also from trespass to land. The majority
of the Intel Court therefore seemed to be aware that US law on this point
differs in a significant respect from the English; it also showed no sign of
confusing cyber-trespass with acts of interference with real property. On the
contrary, the Court expressly rejected the possibility of applying real property
concepts of inviolability to what is clearly personal property, seeing no policy
reason to adopt a ‘rash’ and ‘rigid’ rule of this nature in such cases66. The
majority also warned against over-extending the scope of the tort to protect
interests beyond that which it was originally designed to protect, viz., posses-
sion of a chattel, particularly if the extension was by way of stretching the
damage requirement such that almost any unwanted act of intrusion (such as
an unsolicited telephone call) could constitute an actionable trespass.
Although the Intel Court’s ruling on the general requirements of a tres-
pass to chattel claim in cyberspace will doubtless have a large impact on
future cases, the specific circumstances of the case justify a comparison of
its result with that of the other, prior, cases. As mentioned in the earlier
analysis of the pre-Intel cases, the trespass to chattels claim seems to have
been pressed into service in order to restrain activity which the courts con-
sidered sufficiently illegitimate to require legal intervention, but which
other existing causes of action (e.g., under intellectual property or contract
laws) could not cover. Even though these cases concerned mainly commer-
cial interests that could only, at a stretch, be related directly to the chattel
in question and the plaintiff’s possessory interest thereto, it is difficult to
disagree with the courts’ conclusions on the facts of cases such as Com-
puServe, eBay and Register.com. In Intel, however, an additional factor that
could have underlay the Court’s analysis was the issue of free speech. Even
though the First Amendment issues raised by Hamidi were not, ultimately,
the main basis for the majority’s decision and thus constituted dicta in the
case, the majority decision displays a concern for free speech consider-
ations. This factor, going toward Hamidi’s intent and motives, and Intel’s
inability to show that Hamidi’s actions damaged the kind of interests which
previous courts have considered legitimate to protect, places the Intel case
in a category somewhat apart from those other cases67.
Nonetheless, the remarks made by the Court in Intel emphasizing the
basis for and the nature of the trespass to chattels action (viz., as a species
66 The Court also referred expressly to the academic debate surrounding the use of the metaphor of a
real ‘place’ to describe cyberspace, although it declined to take a position on the matter.
67 See Fibbe, supra n 32.
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of personal and not real property), and the consequence that the requi-
site damage should be linked causally as well as conceptually as such, are
welcome reminders to future courts that, even if trespass remains the doc-
trine of choice to restrain certain kinds of unwanted activity, its precepts
ought not to be conflated with other forms of property, nor should dam-
age be founded on doctrinally suspect grounds. Courts tasked with deciding
future cyber-trespass cases should thus bear in mind this ‘anchoring . . .
[of] a doctrine that had drifted loose of its traditional moorings.’68
Where non-US case law development is concerned, the Intel Court’s
comments ought thus to be just as welcome and useful. In particular, if
non-US courts are to apply the English law conception of trespass to chat-
tels doctrine to cyberspace, the fact that the claim would be actionable per
se means that the potentially-limiting factor of damage would be absent.
In such a case, the need to bear in mind the fundamental basis of a tres-
pass to chattels claim would be even more acute.
2.4 How Significant would the Differences between 
the US and English Law on Trespass to Chattels Be?
As highlighted above, where the US law requires either some form of dam-
age, whether actual or threatened, to the ‘physical condition, quality or
value’ of the chattel, or to the relevant possessory interest in it, the tradi-
tional English view seems to be that trespass to chattels would be actionable
even in the absence of damage. Thus a lawsuit for nominal damages would
be recognized under English law, where in the US the possessor of a chattel
that had not suffered any damage would have no legal remedy other than
the right to use ‘reasonable force’ to protect the inviolability of the chattel.
For the most part, this distinction is likely to be more theoretical than prac-
tical, as it is highly unlikely that anyone would sue, even under the English
doctrine, unless they had suffered some damage worth the expense,
trouble and process of a lawsuit. In the US cyber-trespass cases, the plain-
tiffs all either suffered, or were concerned they would suffer, sufficiently
significant financial, business or other losses if the defendants’ activity con-
tinued unchecked. Thus, even though the US courts may have adopted a
fairly liberal – possibly even doctrinally awkward – interpretation of what is
sufficient to constitute the necessary damage, the outcome of each of the
cases discussed above has been to protect the plaintiff’s interests (largely
commercial) which the courts considered legitimate as against the defend-
ants’ intentional intrusive conduct. In the two cases where the plaintiffs
failed to win a remedy (Ticketmaster and Intel), the court in question was
either not sufficiently convinced of the actual or potential damage suffered
68 See the Case Comment in 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 283, supra n 32, which, while welcoming the limita-
tions on damage re-introduced by the Intel Court, also pointed out the difficulties with proving the requi-
site damage in factual situations of the sort in the case.
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by the plaintiff, particularly where the defendant’s acts were not consid-
ered to constitute illegitimate competition (Ticketmaster), or was unwilling
to extend the trespass doctrine to non-commercial cases with a free speech
element (Intel.) The real theoretical concern, therefore, is whether or not
trespass to chattels is the appropriate doctrine to apply to those cases where
the courts consider the plaintiff’s interests worth protecting.
Any conflation by the US courts of real and personal property concepts
in this context is thus unfortunate, not least for obscuring the real prob-
lem. The costs and implications of using trespass to chattels to protect the
plaintiff’s commercial or other interests include the risk of reducing
open access and affording an alternative avenue of protection to ‘prop-
erty’ that would not otherwise be protected by other means; in both of
these situations, the fact that the plaintiff’s ‘property’ is connected to the
Internet and consists of publicly-available information presents a difficult
interest-balancing issue. On the other hand, the US cases have shown that
‘self-help’ measures that might conceptually fall within the ‘reasonable
force’ allowance usually are not sufficient to protect the plaintiff and her
property against further intrusion by the defendant.
Such questions and conflicting interests will be the same in the UK and
elsewhere, as has been the case in the US. The courts that may be faced with
such difficulties may thus find themselves wrestling less with the problem of
whether damage is necessary (or if so, proven) – a conceptual issue – than
with the more commercially important problems of balancing different pri-
vate and public interests. This does not, of course, render the conceptual issue
unimportant (except, perhaps, from the business and practical perspectives
of the parties to the suit and other, similarly-sited persons.) Where US and
non-US courts continue (or begin) to confront these theoretical issues, one
added concern should perhaps be the potential overlap between an expand-
ing doctrine of cyber-trespass and the concept of ‘unauthorized access.’
3 Equating Cyber-Trespass in the Common 
Law with ‘Unauthorized Access’ in Computer 
Misuse Legislation
In the US, several fairly recent cases seemed to indicate that a mere act of
unwanted ‘intrusion’ into another’s computer systems, where the act was
done without the consent of the other person, could fall not only within
the scope of the doctrine of trespass to chattels, but also run foul of statu-
tory restrictions on computer access, such as those found in the federal
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act69 (CFAA.) In both types of situations, the
69 There are also state laws (statutes) dealing with similar acts; see Kerr, supra n 84.
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courts had to determine what (if any) the extent of the permission given
by the plaintiff to the defendant had been, as that fact was directly relev-
ant to the issue whether or not there had been a trespass or an unauthor-
ized access to the plaintiff’s computers, network or systems. In other
words, what was the limit of, and what in fact constituted, the plaintiff’s
‘consent’ (or lack thereof) to the defendant’s activity. These questions
are important for at least three reasons: (1) it raises the possibility that
chattel owners could have more than one legal remedy to guard against
unwanted activity on their websites, databases, networks and equipment;
(2) intrusions can be made unwelcome by unilaterally-imposed contrac-
tual restrictions on consent; and (3) similar questions, legal issues and
principles can arise in non-US jurisdictions that have computer misuse
legislation.70 Given the breadth of a civil claim in cyber-trespass (as dis-
cussed above) and the discovery that unauthorized access seems to be a
very broad and undefined concept in computer misuse legislation (dis-
cussed below), these questions take on an even larger significance.
3.1 When does an ‘Unwanted Intrusion’ become Actionable 
as an Act of Cyber-trespass, or of Unauthorized Access, 
for Lack of Consent?
As described previously, it is possible under general contract formation
rules to limit a person’s access to and use of a website, database, software
and other intangible (if valuable) information, through contract (includ-
ing electronic forms such as ‘clickwrap’ contracts and possibly ‘browse-
wraps’.)71 Whether or not a person (or for that matter, technology such
70 Different countries may protect different aspects of computer-related crime, and either in the form
of specific computer crime statutes or within more general criminal laws. Common law countries that
have laws dealing with computer misuse and unauthorized access include the UK (the Computer Misuse
Act of 1990), Australia (the Cybercrime Act of 2001), and Singapore (the Computer Misuse Act of 1993,
as amended in 1998 and 2003.) For a fuller listing of countries and their computer crime legislation spe-
cifically dealing with unauthorized access, see Stein Schjolberg, ‘The Legal Framework: Unauthorized
Access to Computer Systems: Penal Legislation in 44 Countries’, last updated August 2003 and available
online at http://www.mosstingrett.no/info/legal.html (page last accessed August 6, 2005.)
71 There have been several US cases on this particular issue, though they have (to date) been con-
cerned mostly with ‘clickwraps’ and ‘shrinkwraps’ (which term refers to contractual provisions found
inside the physical packaging of CD-ROMS and software; such packaging is often wrapped in plastic
material such that the terms cannot be viewed without breaking the wrapping and opening the packag-
ing.) There has been one clear ‘browsewrap’ case where the validity of such contracts was actually in
issue: Specht v Netscape, supra n 58, which held that an arbitration clause was not valid as it (and other con-
tractual terms) could be viewed by the user only if she clicked on several consecutive hyperlinks that took
her through different webpages. Contrasted with the ease by which she could download the software at
issue (by simply clicking on a ‘download’ button displayed on the initial webpage), the court concluded
that she could not be said to have manifested assent to the terms sought to be imposed on her. For fur-
ther analysis and commentary on the question of assent and validity in electronic and online contracts,
see the articles cited supra n 58. Post-Specht cases that touched on similar issues include Pollstar v Gigamania
Ltd, 2000 WL 33 266437 (E. D. Cal. 2000) and Softman Products Company v Adobe Software Systems Inc., 171 F
Supp. 2d 1075 (C. D. Cal. 2001.)
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as a robot, crawler, spider or other automated search and data-gathering
device) is permitted to view, download, edit or otherwise do anything in
relation to a webpage, data, computer program or other information thus
depends in large part on whether there is a contract (express or implied)
with the website/database operator/owner, and the extent of the relev-
ant permission granted thereunder. It would seem that the US courts are
fairly liberal in determining when a plaintiff owner/operator is consid-
ered to have denied or withdrawn the relevant permission, at least in rela-
tion to the question whether or not the user’s access was authorized.
In EF Cultural Travel BV v Zefer Corporation & Explorica, Inc.72, the issue
was whether the defendant’s use of a ‘scraper’ to obtain information off a
website ‘exceeded [his] authorized access’ to the website under the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(4).) The US Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit confirmed that a lack of authorization could
be shown if the website explicitly barred access (subject to any public pol-
icy limitations.) A lack of authorization could also be implicit rather than
explicit (e.g., through the requirement of passwords, which would consti-
tute an implicit restriction through technological means.) However, the
Court considered that it would not be ‘prudentially sound’ or within the
statutory mechanism to base a finding of lack of authorization on a ‘reas-
onable expectations’ test, which the Court considered ‘highly imprecise’
and ‘litigation-spawning’. The Court hastened to add that the ‘reasonable
expectations’ test was not being rejected based on a presumption of open
access; rather, the shortcomings of such a test contrasted baldly with the
ease with which website providers could spell out clearly the restrictions
they wish to place on access.
Prior to EF Cultural Travel v Zefer, US courts had already upheld explicit
prohibitions unilaterally imposed on users by website providers as suffi-
cient to justify a finding of lack of authorization; specifically, through
express restrictions stated on the website provider’s Terms of Service
(TOS.) This was the case in America Online, Inc. v LCGM73, where the East-
ern District of Virginia, in a brief opinion, considered that the defend-
ant’s ‘spamming’ of other AOL subscribers violated AOL’s TOS and ‘as
such’ were unauthorized. The court also found that the elements of a
state trespass to chattels claim (following cases such as CompuServe) were
made out. Similarly, in America Online, Inc. v National Health Care
Discount74 (NHCD), the Northern District of Iowa held that violation of
AOL’s TOS by ‘spamming’ ‘exceeded authorized access’ under the
CFAA. Interestingly, while the NHCD court noted that the evidence might
not have been sufficient to prove whether or not access had been ‘without
72 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2003.)
73 46 F.Supp.2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998.)
74 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000.)
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authorization’ (presumably given that the messages were sent as emails
through the AOL network), the court in LCGM did not seem to distin-
guish between an act of access ‘without authorization’ and an act ‘exceed-
ing authorized access’, nor did it appear to consider the need to do so,
holding only that the relevant CFAA requirements were met by the
defendant’s unauthorized acts. Perhaps unfortunately, the NHCD court
did not comment further on the distinction between acting ‘without
authorization’ and an act ‘exceeding authorized access’, as the evidence
allowed it to rule that the latter had been shown. The implications of the
LCGM court’s interchangeable use of similar terms relating to unauthor-
ized access is discussed further, below.
Where the relevant restriction (e.g., an express bar on screen scraping
or spidering) is contained in the TOS, its validity would fall to be deter-
mined by contract law. Most TOS tend to be in the form of a ‘browse-
wrap’ contract, where the user is not required to click on a button or
other icon to indicate assent to the terms (as would be the case in a ‘click-
wrap’); rather, the TOS can be found only if the user follows (by clicking
on) a hyperlink, which is generally in smallish font and commonly placed
at the bottom of the website homepage, displayed alongside similarly-
sized hyperlinks to other webpages relating to the website provider’s user
policies. Many TOS also contain a provision which states that by using the
website or its services, the user is thereby assenting to the terms governing
her user thereof. The obvious question is thus whether or not the user
can be said to have assented to the actual terms, such that a legally bind-
ing contract can be said to have been formed between her and the web-
site provider75. Where a plaintiff claims that restrictions on access or use
were contained in its website TOS, therefore, in determining whether the
defendant user had the requisite permission to do whatever she was seek-
ing to do on the website, the court would first have to undertake a con-
tract law enquiry76.
Where the relevant restriction is not found in a website TOS, the situ-
ation can be far more difficult, given that it would not even be clear in
such cases whether or not the restriction would have any legal effect at
all, and thus serve to bind the defendant user (or not.) In such cases,
however, it is possible that the plaintiff might be in an even stronger posi-
tion vis-à-vis the defendant on this point, as it may be possible to argue
that, far from being a contractual question, it is a simple matter of fact,
viz., by placing the restriction on its website, the plaintiff is expressly with-
holding her consent to the act complained of. Since the question is outside
75 See the cases and commentary noted supra, n 58.
76 Although, to the extent that Specht and cases such as ProCD v Zeidenberg can be said to provide suffi-
cient guidance on the direction of US law in this respect, US courts may have far less difficulty with this
process than other common law jurisdictions, where this specific issue has either yet to arise to be
decided judicially, or at best has been raised only sporadically.
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the realm of contract, it is also irrelevant whether or not the defendant
saw or could reasonably have seen (and thus be taken to have assented
to) the restriction; what matters is that the plaintiff has explicitly indi-
cated her lack of consent. As such, by flouting the restriction, the defend-
ant is either trespassing or otherwise acting without authorization. In
either case, one of the elements of either cause of action (i.e., trespass or
unauthorized access) may quite easily be made out.
A look at several of the cyber-trespass cases would seem to bear out this
possibility. In CompuServe, eBay, Register.com and Intel, all the plaintiffs had,
in one way or another, effectively notified the defendants of the plaintiffs’
objections to the defendants’ acts, viz., through technological filtering or
blocking attempts (CompuServe and eBay), or actual (Intel) or constructive
(Register.com) notice. At the latest, either a cease-and-desist letter or (per-
haps a rather extreme view though this was the court’s view in Regis-
ter.com) actually bringing a lawsuit could serve as proof of lack of consent
on the plaintiff’s part. This is troubling in the context of cyber-trespass
because of the liberal approach the US courts have taken toward the con-
cept of intermeddling or interference; in computer misuse cases based
on unauthorized access, the same concern arises because of a lack of clar-
ity and rigidity in the definition of the term, which could thus be read to
encompass the kinds of acts constituting lack of consent in the cyber-
trespass cases.
If the fact that courts are willing to allow such a broad interpretation of
what authorization, permission or consent means is viewed in the context
of the development of a broad doctrine of cyber-trespass, then the fact
that neither courts nor legislatures have clearly defined the meaning of
‘unauthorized access’ for purposes of computer misuse must be cause for
further concern. It is telling that none of the cyber-trespass cases has
delved deeply into the overlap between a trespassory act in cyberspace
and an act of ‘unauthorized access’, and that EF Cultural Travel v Explorica
was decided as a case of exceeding authorized access within the scope of
the CFAA, rather than trespass. Given the acts complained of by the
plaintiffs in the CFAA cases and the trespass cases, there is a substantial
overlap in the various activities in both ‘categories’, whether that be
screen scraping (as in Explorica), spidering (as in eBay and Register.com v
Verio) and bulk emailing (as in Hamidi.) In all of these cases (including
Explorica), the defendant(s) used some form of software tool, and/or the
Internet, to access the plaintiff’s Internet-related network or systems
(e.g., a website, a server, or a database), without the plaintiff’s permission.
With the liberal approach toward consent and trespass, it is therefore pos-
sible that a website owner, database operator or other possessor of a chat-
tel connected in cyberspace could also investigate the further option of
proceeding under computer misuse legislation. The defendant’s behav-
ior in many of these instances has been variously determined to possibly
constitute either a trespass to chattels or an act of unauthorized access.
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The AOL v LCGM case, in fact, is an illustration of this. This means that
an action can conceivably be brought under either ‘unauthorized
access’ principles within the relevant computer misuse statute, or cyber-
trespass, whether within or outside of the US, if a similar trend is
observed in judicial interpretation of both sets of legal principles. The
next section will examine the notion of ‘unauthorized access’ under
other major non-US legislation, as a gauge of how likely this overlap-
ping scenario will be.
3.2 US Law on Unauthorized Access: The Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is the main federal statute
dealing with various aspects of computer crime in the US. First passed in
1984, it has since been amended several times, for our purposes most sig-
nificantly in 1986 and 199677. Dealing in part with both criminal prosecu-
tions and civil lawsuits for various computer-related activities involving
‘unauthorized access’, it employs a fairly dizzying number of terms to
describe the various possible offences, thus creating a rather complex
and involved statute. For the most part, it employs two threshold tests that
are directly relevant to the question of an overlap with cyber-trespass, viz.,
the requirements of ‘unauthorized access’ and of intention. For the
former, various subsections utilize (and presumably distinguish between)
differing aspects of ‘unauthorized access’, e.g., as acts of access either
‘without authorization’ or of ‘exceeding authorized access.’78 On the
issue of intention, different subsections seem to underscore a potentially-
significant distinction between doing an act ‘intentionally’ and doing it
‘knowingly.’ A third requirement that merits mention in this respect is
77 For a history of the various major changes to the Act and their implications, see Reid Skibell, ‘Cyber-
crimes and Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act’, 18 Berkeley Tech. L. J.
909 (2003.) It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine more general, albeit important, issues raised
by cybercrime, e.g., the scope of what constitutes a cybercrime, the need for specific cybercrime laws to
capture activities not otherwise covered by traditional criminal laws, and international and jurisdictional
matters. On these issues, see, e.g., Marc D. Goodman and Susan W, Brenner, ‘The Emerging Consensus
on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace’, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. 3, and Richard W. Downing, ‘Shoring Up
the Weakest Link: What Lawmakers Around the World Need to Consider in Developing Comprehensive
Laws To Combat Cybercrime’, 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 705 (2005.) Some commentators have noted the
application by US courts of tort remedies to cybercrime (including trespass to chattel claims in the cases
discussed in the main text), as an illustration of the necessity for and efficacy of private law enforcement
in this area: Michael L. Rustad, ‘Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier’, 11 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 63 (2001.) This possibility has also been acknowledged specifically in the area of com-
puter viruses: Robin A. Brooks, ‘Deterring the Spread of Viruses Online: Can Tort Law Tighten the Net?’,
17 Rev. Litig. 343 (1998.)
78 Although access ‘without authorization’ is not defined in the CFAA, ‘exceeding authorized access’ is
defined as ‘access[ing] a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter informa-
tion in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter’. In this article, the term ‘unau-
thorized access’ is used generally to include both forms; where a distinction is necessary, each phrase will
be used accordingly.
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the need for damage to have been caused, and ‘damage’ is largely crafted
in monetary terms and values.
The following are examples of the varying aspects of ‘unauthorized
access’ used in the relevant parts of the CFAA, and shows also the signifi-
cance of the distinction between acting ‘intentionally’ and acting ‘know-
ingly.’ First, ‘knowingly access[ing] a computer without authorization or
exceeding authorized access’ to obtain information protected for national
security reasons and then disclosing it to unauthorized personnel is an
offence under § 1030(a)(1.) Secondly, ‘intentionally access[ing] a com-
puter without authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access’ to obtain
either certain financial information, information from a US government
agency, or information from a ‘protected computer’79 where the conduct
involved an interstate or foreign communication, is an offence under §
1030(a)(2)(A), (B) and (C) respectively. Thirdly, accessing ‘intentionally
[and] without [the requisite] authorization to access any nonpublic com-
puter of a department or agency of the United States’ can be an offence
under § 1030(a)(3.) Fourthly, furthering a fraud by ‘knowingly and with
intent to defraud, access[ing] a protected computer without authorization,
or exceed[ing] authorized access’ thereto, is an offence under §
1030(a)(4.) Fifthly (and perhaps most generally applicable to civil cases
also resembling cyber-trespass), whoever ‘(i) knowingly causes the trans-
mission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of
such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a pro-
tected computer; (ii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or
(iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization,
and as a result of such conduct, causes damage’ commits an offence under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A) if, additionally, the damage requirement is met80.
The requisite damage for any unauthorized acts under § 1030(a)(5)(A)
is listed under § 1030(a)(5)(B) as any of the following: ‘(i) loss to 1 or more
persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value; (ii)
the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment,
79 A ‘protected computer’ is defined as including a computer ‘used in interstate or foreign commerce
or communications, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States’ (§ 1030(e)(2)(B.)) It is
noteworthy also that the term ‘computer’ is fairly widely and exhaustively defined, as meaning ‘an elec-
tronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logi-
cal, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility
directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an auto-
mated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device’ (§ 1030(e)(1.))
80 Other additional offences include ‘knowingly and with intent to defraud traffic[king] (as defined in
section 1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer may be accessed without
authorization’ where such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce or the computer concerned
is used by the US Government (§ 1030(a)(6)), and ‘transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to cause damage to a protected computer’ with an intention to
extort (§ 1030(a)(7.))
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of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more indi-
viduals; (iii) physical injury to any person; (iv) a threat to public health or
safety; or (v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a govern-
ment entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national
defense, or national security.’ For most of the kinds of cases under discus-
sion, the relevant head of damage will be that under § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i),
which damages, if claimed as the sole injury, are limited expressly to ‘eco-
nomic damages’81. Damages are also intended to be ‘compensatory’,
though injunctive or other ‘equitable relief’ is also available as a remedy82.
Several commentators have noted that much computer misuse legisla-
tion, including the CFAA, is premised on property notions (and hence
property-rule protections)83 and that, outside the US, many jurisdictions
have also adopted similar statutes relating to unauthorized access to
computers84. Given the thoughtful and extensive analysis already provided
by other authors85 of the US cases of ‘unauthorized access’, it seems timely,
therefore, to examine some non-US legislation and case law in this area, to
determine if the approach in non-US jurisdictions on the issue of ‘unau-
thorized access’ is similar to that displayed by US courts so far, and what sig-
nificance, if any, should be attributed to the differing wordings or aspects to
‘unauthorized access’ captured by these in comparison to the US statutes.
3.3 Computer Misuse Legislation in the UK and Singapore
Like their US federal counterpart, the UK and Singapore86 computer mis-
use statutes also reveal a property-based notion of computer crime, as
81 § 1030(g.)
82 ibid. It should be noted that it is this subsection that clearly authorizes a person who suffers loss or
damage because of any of the acts listed above to bring a civil action.
83 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, ‘Defending Cyberproperty’, 79 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 2164 (2004), noting diffi-
culties with adopting either property rules or liability rules as a basis for protection of cyberproperty, and
that the choice between them is far more complex and involves perhaps some variant or ‘hybrid’ rules.
See also McGowan, ‘Website Access: The Case for Consent’, supra n 59.
84 Orin S. Kerr, ‘Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting ‘Access’ and ‘Authorization’ in Computer Misuse
Statutes’, 78 NYU L.R. 1596 (2003.) For a list of countries with such laws, other than the US and as of
2002, see Schjolberg, supra n 70, and noted also in Kerr.
85 Bellia, supra n 83, and Kerr, ibid. Some of the cases, such as the AOL cases, Explorica and Register.com,
have also been discussed in the main text, supra.
86 The Singapore Computer Misuse Act is included in this discussion for a number of reasons: (1) it is
an early (1993) but often updated (most recently in 2003) example of a general computer misuse statute;
(2) it resembles closely the UK Act, which as the main computer misuse law of a major common law juris-
diction provides a useful comparison to the US position; and (3) it also resembles (in some definitions
and offences) the US CFAA. For example, the Singapore definition of a computer is ‘an electronic, mag-
netic, optical, electrochemical, or other data processing device, or a group of such interconnected or
related devices, performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility
or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device or group of
such interconnected or related devices, but does not include (a) an automated typewriter or typesetter;
(b) a portable hand held calculator; (c) a similar device which is non-programmable or which does not
contain any data storage facility; or (d) such other device as the Minister may, by notification in the
Gazette, prescribe’: Section 2(1), the Computer Misuse Act (Cap 50A, Singapore Statutes, 1998 Rev. Ed.)
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well as a lack of clarity or definition as to the concept of ‘unauthorized
access.’ Given that these two statutes were drafted within three years of
each other87, it is perhaps not surprising to find these similarities between
the two, as well as substantially similar types of offences. For example,
with respect to the more general concept of when an act of unauthorized
access might constitute a criminal offence, both the Singapore and UK
statutes subtitle their respective sections, ‘Unauthorised Access to Com-
puter Material.’ Section 3 of the Singapore Computer Misuse Act
(SCMA)88 states that a person who ‘knowingly causes a computer to per-
form any function for the purpose of securing access without authority to
any program or data held in any computer’ commits an offence, while
section 1 of the UK Computer Misuse Act (UKCMA) states that a person
commits an offence if ‘(a) [he] causes a computer to perform any func-
tion with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any com-
puter; (b) the access he intends to secure is unauthorised; and (c) he
knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function
that that is the case.’ There are interesting minor variations in language
and, possibly, consequential scope, between the two sections. For
example, where the Singapore statute uses the phrase ‘without authority’,
the UK equivalent uses the word ‘unauthorised.’ It would appear that the
UK usage is more consistent, at least internally within the statute, as the
word ‘unauthorised’ is used throughout the statute to condition access.
In the SCMA, the phrase ‘unauthorised access’ is used as well as ‘access
without authority.’ It is therefore not surprising that, while the definition
of ‘unauthorised access’ is identical in both statutes, the Singapore stat-
ute has an additional phrase, in that its definition does not just encom-
pass when an act is considered to be unauthorised, it applies also to an act
that is ‘done without authority’. While this might be a trivial point for
practical purposes, in principle it seems somewhat unnecessary, and adds
avoidable complexity, to have two usages and phrases to describe the one
concept.
Another difference in the ‘unauthorised access’ sections of both stat-
utes is the placement of the knowledge (i.e., intent) requirement. Under
section 3 of the SCMA, it is not entirely clear whether the word ‘know-
ingly’ is intended to qualify both the causing of a computer to perform a
particular function as well as the purpose of securing unauthorised
access. In the UKCMA, this point seems clearer, in that the placement
and usage of the word ‘knows’ (in section 1(c)) seems intended to mean
the accused knows that the access he is intending to secure is unauthor-
ised. It would thus seem as though there is a higher standard (in there
87 The UK Act was passed in 1990, the original Singapore statute in 1993.
88 For a description of the history and scope of the SCMA, see Christopher Lee Gen-Min, ‘Offences
Created by the Computer Misuse Act 1993’, [1994] Sing. J. L. S. 263.
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being more to prove) for knowledge under the SCMA compared to the
UKCMA.
More to the point of the present discussion, however, is the actual defi-
nition in both statutes as to what constitutes ‘unauthorised access’, which,
though somewhat unhelpfully limited in some ways89, suggests useful
indications of how the UK and Singapore courts would approach Profes-
sor Kerr’s description of the US problem of what ‘access’ means90. Under
the SCMA (Section 2(5)) and the UKCMA (Section 17(5)), access is
unauthorised if the person in question ‘is not himself entitled to control
access of the kind in question to the program or data, and he does not have
consent to access by him of the kind in question to the program or data
from any person who is so entitled’ (emphasis added.) It ought, however,
to be noted that both the SCMA and the UKCMA speak expressly of
access ‘to any program or data held in any computer’91. Notwithstanding
such an apparent limitation on the concept of access, it is submitted that
the principle that access means ‘access of the kind in question’ ought
equally to apply to any other types of access, without any descriptive limits
as to whether it is a particular aspect, portion or function of a computer,
system or network that is being accessed. There seems no reason in policy
or principle to use such a meaning of access only when access is to pro-
gram or data held in a computer.
At lease one UK case has shed some authoritative light as to the inter-
pretation of the phrase ‘access of the kind in question.’ In Regina v Bow
Street Magistrates Court and Allison (A.P.) ex parte Government of the United
States of America92, the House of Lords clarified unanimously that as a
‘plain meaning subsidiary’ to the other substantive provisions of the Act
(including Section (1)), ‘the authority must relate not simply to the data
or programme but also to the actual kind of access secured. [T]he word
‘control’ [does not mean] a physical sense of the ability to operate or
manipulate the computer. It does not introduce any concept that author-
ity to access one piece of data should be treated as authority to access
other pieces of data ‘of the same kind’ notwithstanding that the relevant
person did not in fact have authority to access that piece of data. Section 1
refers to the intent to secure unauthorised access to any programme or
89 Particularly as it relates only to accessing a program or data held in a computer. As explained infra,
however, there ought in principle to be no reason why accessing program or data should be treated dif-
ferently from accessing a computer, a network, a system or generally.
90 Supra n 84.
91 Both statutes also state expressly what securing access to such program or data means, viz., ‘a person
secures access to any program or data held in a computer if by causing a computer to perform any func-
tion he (a) alters or erases the program or data; (b) copies or moves it to any storage medium other than
that in which it is held or to a different location in the storage medium in which it is held; (c) uses it; or
(d) causes it to be output from the computer in which it is held (whether by having it displayed or in any
other manner), and references to access to a program or data (and to an intent to secure such access)
shall be read accordingly’: Section 2(2) (SCMA) and Section 17(2) (UKCMA.)
92 [1999] 3 WLR 620.
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data. These plain words leave no room for any suggestion that the relev-
ant person may say: ‘Yes, I know that I was not authorised to access that
data but I was authorised to access other data of the same kind’.’ As such,
in the Allison case, a credit analyst who obtained confidential data from a
part of her employer’s database that she did not have the authority to
access (although she had the ability to do so) was held to have secured
‘unauthorised access’ to such data within the meaning of Section 1 of the
UKCMA93.
This ruling by the House of Lords thus laid to rest some doubts that
had been created by a wider reading of Section 17(2) and the concept of
‘unauthorised access’ in an earlier case, D.P.P. v Bignell94. While being
careful to say that the Divisional Court in Bignell might well have reached
a correct conclusion on the facts, the House of Lords in Allison stated
firmly that the court had erred in its interpretation of Section 17(5) (and
thus, Section 1) by misreading the language of Section 17 and glossing
over certain concepts under the UKCMA, including reading access to
mean ‘access to data of the kind in question’ rather than, more generally,
‘access of the kind in question’ to the relevant data.95 The House of Lords
cited the Working Party Paper and Report of the Law Commission that
led to the passage of the UKCMA, noting that it had considered problems
of insider misuse of computers and systems to be as significant as ‘hack-
ing’ by outsiders. The narrower Bignell interpretation of the language and
purpose of the UKCMA would have limited the mischief the Act was
meant to deal with.
The House of Lords’ insistence on the ‘plain meaning’ and clarity of
Sections 1 and 17 of the UKCMA is to be welcomed, as is its acknowledg-
ment of the correctness of the court’s decision on the facts in Bignell, des-
pite that court’s misinterpretations of the law. The fact that the Allison
and Bignell decisions ultimately went the opposite way on the facts is not
problematic, as they each illustrate the proper reach and application of
Section 1, read with Section 17. Where the employee in Allison who was
alleged to have conspired with Mr. Allison had the ability to access the
entire database but had authority only to access certain data records
within it, her access of those records she was not supposed to access must
surely be illegitimate. The House of Lords held that those acts fell
‘squarely’ within the ambit of Section 1. In contrast, the police employee
in Bignell who obtained confidential data for the two police officers
93 For a case comment on Allison, see Kelly Stein, ‘Unauthorised Access and the UK Computer Misuse
Act 1990: The House of Lords Leaves No Room for Ambiguity’, C.T.L.R. 2000, 6(3), 63–66 (2000.) For a
case comment on Bignell, see Clive Gringras, ‘To Be Great Is To Be Misunderstood: the Computer Misuse
Act 1990’, C.T.L.R. 1997, 3(5), 213–215 (1997.)
94 [1998] Cr.App.R. 1.
95 The lower court in Allison, being constrained by the earlier decision in Bignell, had read the UKCMA
similarly, viz., its purpose was to protect the integrity of computer systems where the integrity of data
would be protected by the 1998 UK Data Protection Act.
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charged under Section 1 had both the ability and the authority to access
the entire database and the data within it. He only provided the data to
the two officers because they misrepresented the purpose of their request
to him. In both cases, therefore, it can be said that each court reached
the correct decision on the facts, as to whether ‘access of the kind in ques-
tion’ was authorized or not.
Both Bignell and Allison were considered by a Singapore district court in
Public Prosecutor v Loh Chai Huat.96 The district judge adopted a wide read-
ing of Section 3 of the SCMA (the equivalent of Section 1 of the UKCMA)
on the basis that this gave effect to the legislative intent to capture as
many offences involving unauthorized access as possible. She also held
that the purpose for the access could be relevant in determining whether
access was authorized, that authorization was to be determined at the
point of access and that the knowledge requirement included willful
blindness to the effects of one’s actions97. In Lim Siong Khee v Public
Prosecutor98, the question of access ‘without authority’ under Section 3 of
the SCMA (and, correspondingly, Section 2(5) regarding ‘access of the
kind in question to the program or data’) was considered by the
Singapore High Court. The Court held that even where a person may
have had the consent of another person to access the latter’s email
account for the purpose of assisting that other person with access while
the two were traveling abroad, such consent would not extend to accessing
the account once they had returned, in order to send off ‘lurid emails’ or
to track the account-holder’s movements. Where free web-based email
services were concerned, the Court considered also that ‘consent’ for the
purpose of access meant the consent of the account-holder and not the
email service provider.99 In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowl-
edged this to be the ‘general understanding of both consumers and the
industry’, thus demonstrating a commonsensical and practical approach
that tacitly bases a legal rule on social and commercial norms.
Unlike the US, neither the UK nor Singapore statutes expressly include
or create offences that depend on a person’s having exceeding their
authority. Nevertheless, in discussing Bignell, the House of Lords in
96 [2001] SGDC 174.
97 On the facts, however, she found in favor of the accused as he lacked the requisite mens rea and it was
also not clear that the purpose of accessing the database in question was such as to render him unauthor-
ized to access it. The case concerned a junior police officer who accessed a police database at the request
of a senior officer, who only informed the former that the data was wanted for personal reasons after the
act of access had been performed. Although the accused had used a case number from one of his own
investigations to access the database, which was technically forbidden, the court found that this was com-
mon practice amongst the officers, who were also accustomed to assisting each other with information
and requests on investigations other than their own. The facts and result of Loh Chai Huat thus resemble
those of Bignell, even adopting a wide reading of ‘unauthorized access’ as per Allison.
98 [2001] 2 SLR 342.
99 The Court also took into account the privacy policies and terms of service of several leading free web-
based email service providers.
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Allison stated that the police computer operator in Bignell ‘did not exceed
his authority’ when he acted on the request by the police officers to
access and provide them with the data they wanted. In Loh Chai Huat, the
Singapore district court opined that if the police database was meant to
be used only for investigating a police officer’s own cases, the officer
would have exceeded his authority to access it if he used it to screen for
third parties; similarly, if access was to be for a particular purpose, access
for an extraneous or forbidden purpose would exceed authorized access.
It is interesting that the courts in these countries would be likely to treat
any act outside the person’s right and ability to conduct access of the kind in
question to be an act that exceeded that person’s authority. In many
instances, of course, this will almost certainly be the case, as to exceed
one’s authority must necessarily largely follow from having reached the
limits of that authority. The UKCMA and SCMA, however, are of particu-
lar assistance in this regard because they circumscribe the extent and
nature of authorized access, in Sections 17(5) and 2(5) respectively. The
judges in the cases discussed above also refer expressly to Parliamentary
intent to capture not only hacking into a computer system by outsiders,
but also the abuse of authority (such as misuse of network access privi-
leges) by insiders. The distinction between computer misuse by an
insider and an outsider is generally statutorily expressed through a dis-
tinction between ‘access without authorization’ (outsider misuse) and
‘exceeding authorized access’ (insider misuse), as in the US CFAA. The
UK and Singapore legislatures, however, seem to have elected to fold
these two related concepts into a more general unifying principle of
‘unauthorized access’, and this seems to have been recognized, even if it
was only in dicta, by the case law in those jurisdictions. Since the US CFAA
already contains a definition for ‘exceeding authorized access’ that
requires access ‘without authorization’ (in order to obtain access to or
alter information within the computer that the accessor is not entitled to
access), it is open to the US courts to also adopt an approach toward
‘unauthorized access’ that resembles the UK and Singapore approaches
of, first, conditioning access by reference to the type of access at issue in
the particular case, and secondly, by expressly relating authorization to
both the right (entitlement to control) and the ability (consent to access)
to that particular form of access,.
The structure and language of the SCMA and the UKCMA100 are such
that the courts in those jurisdictions have to parse the language very
finely, in the context of the statutory purpose, in order to determine if
and to what extent the alleged criminal activities fall within their scope.
While the US CFAA is highly similar in scope and purpose to the SCMA
100 In particular, the statement that access means ‘of the kind in question’ and the legislative inclusion
of definitions for ‘unauthorised access’ and ‘securing access to a program or data held in a computer.’
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and the UKCMA, its legislative history and specific language is sufficiently
different such that it is possible that US courts may well have different
basis and reasons for having a different – whether wider or narrower –
interpretation of ‘unauthorized access’ under the US law. To the extent
that none of these legislatures have clearly defined this concept, a differ-
ent approach by the US courts that would create a greater divergence in
meaning with other common law countries utilizing the same general
concept may be unfortunate. The UK and Singapore statutes, and their
respective courts, seem to demonstrate a commonsensical approach
toward refining the existing statutory definition of ‘unauthorised access’
without undue linguistic acrobatics. It is true that there may be a stronger
basis for this approach in these countries, given the clearer statutory
expression of legislative intent therein, but there seems little difficulty in
either principle or policy that would prevent the US courts from follow-
ing the same approach.
It has been noted that computer misuse statutes were passed as a legis-
lative means to deal with forms of cybercrime that could not be dealt with
adequately under traditional criminal laws.101 The principles and rules
behind trespass, burglary and theft provided a ‘natural conceptual point
of departure’102, buttressed by the prevalence of the property
metaphor103. As a result, statutes such as the CFAA, UKCMA and SCMA
reveal a reliance on property concepts, particularly in the notions of
‘access’104 and the causation of damage.105
Where ‘access’ is concerned, viewing this concept through a property
lens can affect how broadly, and how, a court interprets it. Whether one
views virtual ‘access’ (e.g., to a website, database or computer system) as
approximating (metaphorically) real-world entry to a physical place (e.g.,
a shop or library, including, perhaps, a ‘lock’ to such a ‘place’ manifested
by the need to key in a password or access code), or whether the same act
of virtual access occurs only when the user ‘interacts’ with the computer
(e.g., either by just the sending of a message or data query, or perhaps
requiring the consequent response, whether automated or otherwise, by
the computer) can affect when, legally, access is deemed to have taken
101 See, e.g., Skibell, supra n 77, and Kerr, supra n 84.
102 Kerr, ibid.
103 Aaron Burstein, ‘A Survey of Cybercrime in the United States’, 18 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 313 (2003.)
104 e.g., access to a program or data held in a computer, modifying the contents of a computer
(UKCMA and SCMA), interfering with or obstructing the lawful use of a computer or disclosing pass-
words or access codes (SCMA), § 1030(a)(6) (US CFAA.) It is difficult, however, to see what other ‘trig-
ger’ or underlying general principle could have been used for computer misuse besides the fact of
‘unauthorized access.’ Perhaps the real problem is not what the ‘trigger’ is or how it is phrased, but
rather how it is interpreted by the courts.
105 e.g., damage meaning ‘impairment to a computer or the integrity or availability of data, a program
or system, or information’ that, inter alia, causes physical injury or economic loss of a certain amount ‘in
value’ (SCMA and CFAA.)
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place. Although no clear approach has emerged in the US case law, at
least one court has taken an extremely broad approach to ‘access’ under
the CFAA, stating that ‘[f]or purposes of the CFAA, when someone sends
an e-mail message from his or her own computer, and the message then
is transmitted through a number of other computers until it reaches its
destination, the sender is making use of all of those computers, and is
therefore ‘accessing’ them.’106
Additionally, whatever the conclusion on ‘access’, whether such access
is then ‘unauthorized’ can also depend on various perspectives107. At least
two possibilities in this regard have already surfaced in the US case law on
‘unauthorized access’: either violating a contractual or other express
notice (e.g., the AOL cases, Register.com), or bypassing a code-based
restriction on access (e.g., CompuServe and eBay.) Should the US courts
adopt a broad approach not just to the question of ‘access’ but also to
that of ‘authorization’ (as arguably, they may already have done in some
of these cases), particularly if they do so without much in-depth analysis
of the meaning of each word as well as the phrase as a whole (as in Regis-
ter.com), the implications for open access and doctrinal vagueness can be
worrying.
3.4 Defining ‘Unauthorized Access’: Proposals and Problems
The potential difficulties with viewing unauthorized access from a pure
property perspective have already been noted108. Professor Orin Kerr has
suggested that the US courts adopt a broad construction of the word
‘access’ and narrow the scope of ‘unauthorized access’ by limiting the
meaning of ‘unauthorized’ to cases only where code-based restrictions
have been circumvented; a violation of contractual restrictions (much
less notices of lack of consent) would not suffice.109 Code-based restric-
tions, however, are to be limited only to those instances where the user
tricks the computer into allowing her privileges she would not otherwise
have (e.g., by entering a false access code or by exploiting a weakness in
the code such as to bypass the program’s intended function.) Professor
Kerr’s formulation of code-based restrictions for unauthorized access
purposes thus would not include the sort of behavior at issue in eBay,
where the spider ignored the technological robot exclusion header
(whether or not there was notification or a contractual term governing
the existence and treatment of such technology.) Nor would it include
other self-help cases such as CompuServe and Intel, where the plaintiffs
had endeavored to block or evade the defendants’ activity through
106 AOL v NHCD, supra n 72. See also the discussion in Kerr, supra n 84.
107 Kerr, ibid.
108 See discussion supra; see also Bellia, supra n 85, and Kerr, ibid.
109 Ibid.
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technological and other means. The exclusion of these cases and activi-
ties from Professor Kerr’s proposal, however, is not necessarily a bad
thing. If these cases, which are outside of the CFAA context, continue to
be good law (i.e., as tort cases), the plaintiff who can show the necessary
interference and damage can still claim against a defendant intruder.
Much of the concern over an overly broad interpretation of ‘unauthor-
ized access’ stems from the fact that computer misuse legislation governs
mostly criminal conduct, with only certain allowances for recovery in
some civil cases (such as under the CFAA § 1030(a)(5.)) To allow con-
tract-based restrictions (particularly when they are liberally construed in
favor of the party imposing the terms) and civil law concerns (e.g., of
unfair competition) to dictate the scope of the main ‘trigger’ concept for
criminal liability seems unwise.
The same holds true even outside of the US, possibly even more so. In
the UK and Singapore, which were the two jurisdictions whose ‘unauthor-
ized access’ provisions were examined, there is no allowance under the
UKCMA or the SCMA for civil proceedings against the perpetrator of the
intrusive act, unlike the US CFAA. This may reduce the risk that civil
cases and their interpretations of a concept also utilized in the criminal
law will dictate how that concept will be applied in a criminal case. Since
the types of private and public interest protected by the civil (tort and
contract) law can differ significantly from those protected by the criminal
law, this prevention of ‘doctrine creep’ would be welcome. The fact
remains, however, that in the UK and Singapore, those few criminal cases
of computer misuse have shown that the courts there adopt a fairly liberal
approach toward the concept of ‘unauthorized access’, albeit for public
policy reasons rooted primarily in the criminal law (e.g., the legislative
intent to cast as wide a net as possible over as many acts of computer
intrusion as possible while remaining technology-neutral.110) There may
thus still be a possibility that, even without a specific allowance for civil
proceedings, unauthorized access statutes could ‘criminalize the law of
contract involving the use of computers’111 in the UK and Singapore.
Whether this will turn out to be the case could depend, in large part, on
whether or not civil cases arise in these jurisdictions that invite the courts
110 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the UKCMA does not even have a definition of ‘computer’,
unlike the US CFAA and the SCMA. In 2004, the All Party Internet Group (APIG) of the UK issued a
report on the UKCMA, calling for certain updates and extensions to be made, particularly in light of the
European Union Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems in 2002 and
the Convention on Cybercrime of 2004. Interestingly, adding a definition for ‘computer’ was not one of the
recommendations. See http://www.apig.org.uk for a copy of the report (page last accessed August 10,
2005). Since this paper was completed, amendments to the UKCMA have been introduced into Parlia-
ment as part of the proposed Police and Justice Bill 2006, and are (as of June 2006) being debated in the
House of Lords. The amendments include a very broad offence aimed at ‘denial of service’ attacks, which
criminalizes any ‘unauthorised act in relation to a computer’, if done with the ‘requisite intent and the
requisite knowledge’.
111 Kerr, supra n 84.
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to consider notions of unauthorized access. Specifically, if civil cases are
brought in a UK or Singapore court alleging cyber-trespass, the courts
there will have to determine whether or not they will follow the lead of
the US courts in adapting the trespass to chattels doctrine to cyberspace.
In so doing, they may well have to confront fact situations similar to those
in the cases described above, in which case they may have to decide
whether or not activities such as violating a TOS, bypassing a technical
restriction or ignoring a notice to stop the unwanted act constitutes the
necessary interference. In effect, then, the courts in such instances will be
asked to rule on ‘unauthorized access’ in a civil context. The interesting
question that could arise in the future, assuming the US approach is the
direction the UK and Singapore courts choose to take, is whether or not
such decisions will in turn affect the criminal courts’ interpretation of
‘unauthorized access’ under the computer misuse statutes. Given the
already-broad approach taken in Allison and the Singapore cases, this
may not, however, be much of an issue. Conversely, it is also possible that
the inapplicability of the UKCMA and SCMA to civil cases would militate
against a criminal court’s looking to civil cases to inform its decision,
particularly as cyber-trespass cases are not expressly predicated on ‘unau-
thorized access’, even though in effect, at their broadest, they probably are.
The preceding discussion shows a general similarity in approach
between the US, UK and Singapore courts with respect to whether a wide
or narrow interpretation of ‘unauthorized access’ ought to be taken
under their respective statutes. Although the UK and Singapore statutes
are structured somewhat differently from the US CFAA, the ‘trigger’ for
liability (criminal) is practically identical. The US CFAA, however, has the
added complication of an act ‘exceeding authorized access’, so the US
courts will have the additional task in some cases of parsing and distin-
guishing that concept from ‘access without authorization.’ One way of
looking at the problem could be to say that where the US federal law dis-
tinguishes between ‘access without authorization’ and ‘exceeding autho-
rized access’, the UKCMA considers both as aspects of and under the
rubric of ‘unauthorized access’, such that which aspect a particular case
raises would be a question of fact and dependent on the circumstances of
each case. The problem with this approach, however, is that the
Singapore statute appears to have taken a position slightly out of sync with
it, in that the SCMA uses both ‘unauthorised access’ and ‘access without
authority.’ Yet this may not pose too much of a definitional problem as the
SCMA seems to use these two phrases almost interchangeably. It may thus
be possible to construe ‘unauthorized access’ as a general concept that
includes ‘access without authorization (or without authority)’ as well as
‘exceeding authorized access.’ Besides according with some of the usages in
the US CFAA and Parliamentary intent in the UK and Singapore, such rec-
ognition would certainly introduce an element of uniformity that would be
welcome in this rather complex and, so far, relatively unstudied area of law.
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4 Conclusion
The US cyber-trespass cases offer an interesting study of the problem of
providing a legal remedy in cases of unwanted intrusive activity, where
such activity is considered unwarranted in the sense that it is seen to
damage the plaintiff’s legitimate business or other interests. In granting
injunctive remedies against further and repeated intrusions, the US
courts have applied and extended a longstanding common law doctrine
in a fairly imaginative and liberal way. Despite the volley of academic
alarm over the extent of this application and the implications
thereof112, it is possible to view the courts’ actions, simply, as doing the
right thing once the plaintiff presents a convincing case that her inter-
ests are in need of a legal remedy. One may thus question the method
(particularly where this either confuses different doctrines and con-
cepts, or pays short shrift to the implications or risks of doing so) but
not the fairness of the result. A non-US court should thus pay heed not
just to the conceptual leaps it may be asked to make in the context of
the traditional trespass to chattels doctrine, but also to the competing
interests involved in ruling one way or the other. Although the rise of
anti-’spam’ legislation and specific remedies therefor may alleviate the
need for trespass notions to be applied to ‘spam’ cases, there will be
other instances where the plaintiff will have no other recourse than to
try to persuade a court to apply cyber-trespass principles, including
where the defendant is alleged to have engaged in unfair competitive
behavior. Whether a non-US common law court will tread the same
path as the US courts have done remains to be seen, but it is hoped
that, whatever the outcome, a more thorough conceptual examination,
interest-balancing exercise and risk analysis will be performed than
seems to have been the case hitherto in the US.
The other main point of this article has been the lack of recognition of
the potential overlap between a broad doctrine of cyber-trespass and the
concept of ‘unauthorized access’ in computer misuse legislation (and
cases arising thereunder.) Since the latter concept applies primarily to
criminal conduct outside the US, it is perhaps not surprising that the
overlap has not been acknowledged by a non-US court which has in any
case yet to see its first case of cyber-trespass. On the other hand, the fact
that ‘unauthorized access’ can also form the basis for a civil claim in the
US, coupled with the line of cyber-trespass cases there, means that an ana-
lysis of the implications of an overlap between the two concepts is per-
haps timely, but has to date not been highlighted as much as it could
have been.
112 See the articles noted supra n 32.
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Non-US courts could thus have a unique opportunity to explore the
conceptual and practical implications of both cyber-trespass and ‘unau-
thorized access’ principles. It is also not too late, nor irrelevant, for US
courts faced with a civil claim under the CFAA to do so. Any such judicial
analysis would be a welcome move toward consistency and a greater com-
parative understanding of concepts that have a common basis and similar
grounds in the jurisdictions highlighted in this article.
